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Abstract. The decisions that human beings make to allocate time has significant bearing on eco-
nomic output and to the sustenance of social networks. The time allocation problem motivates our
formal analysis of the resource allocation game, where agents on a social network, who have asymmet-
ric, private interaction preferences, make decisions on how to allocate time, a bounded endowment,
over their neighbors. Unlike the well-known opinion formation game on a social network, our game
appears not to be a potential game, and the Best-Response dynamics is non-differentiable making
the analysis of Best-Response dynamics non-trivial.
In our game, we consider two types of player behavior, namely optimistic or pessimistic, based on
how they use their time endowment over their neighbors. To analyze Best-Response dynamics, we
circumvent the problem of the game not being a potential game, through the lens of a novel two-level
potential function approach. We show that the Best-Response dynamics converges point-wise to a
Nash Equilibrium when players are all: optimistic; pessimistic; a mix of both types. Finally, we show
that the Nash Equilibrium set is non-convex but connected, and Price of Anarchy is unbounded while
Price of Stability is one. Extensive simulations over a stylized grid reveals that the distribution of
quality of the convergence points is unimodal—we conjecture that presence of unimodality is tied to
the connectedness of Nash Equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Social networks play a central role in our lives, both for personal and professional growth. In-
formation diffusion over a social network is one extensively analyzed class of problems (Feldman
et al., 2014; Bakshy et al., 2012; Myers and Leskovec, 2012; Chierichetti et al., 2011; Karp et al.,
2000). Within the Theoretical CS community, the information diffusion problem is often mod-
eled as a network game where a player’s utility depends on her own and her neighbor’s actions,
e.g., (Chierichetti et al., 2013; Feldman et al., 2014; Ferraioli et al., 2016). A common underlying
assumption: a player has adequate resources (e.g. time) to interact with each of her neighbors,
and that her payoff is independent of the amount of time spent with each of its neighbors. In the
real world, agents have a finite endowment of resources. The dynamics of network games where
agents have bounded resources is less well studied and is the focus of this paper.
Research on how individuals spend time, has a rich history in Economics (Juster and Stafford,
1991; Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1977). As Juster and Stafford (1991) state in the introduction to
their article, “... the fundamental scarce resource in the economy is the availability of human
time, and that the allocation of time to various activities will ultimately determine the relative
prices of goods and services, the growth path of real output, and the distribution of income.”
The work of Becker (1965) spurred the analysis of “non-market” time (i.e. outside of work), in
particular how individuals utilized their time at home and consequences of time use at home on
the market. Gronau (1977) further sharpened the analysis of “non-market time” by distinguishing
between time spent on “work at home” and “leisure.” Juster and Stafford (1991) further identified
“socializing” as a component of “leisure.”
Despite having a limited amount of time (an inelastic resource) each day, we spend it on
sustaining and expanding our social capital. While there is no formal definition of “social capital”,
there is a growing consensus that “social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits
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by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures.” (Portes, 1998). To develop
social capital, Miritello et al. (2013) suggests that we spend time on communication to maintain
friendships and (Roberts and Dunbar, 2011) finds that expending time is crucial to the sustenance
of social networks. This connection between expenditure of time and its effect on the social network
motivates the following question:
How would social interactions evolve on a social network when individuals are resource
constrained?
Consider for example, an academic who receives requests on her time to meet for the coming
week: from her PhD students, undergrads who are taking her class, colleagues who want to go to
lunch, the occasional meeting request from her department chair. The academic may have private
preferences with whom she should spend time and will respond with counter proposals: a PhD
student who wants to meet for an hour may get thirty minutes; an undergrad fifteen minutes;
agree to spend an hour with her peers; agree to meet for the time that her chair asks. Each
person asking her for time, is simultaneously responding to requests on their time from their
social network. In each case, when someone asks for time, the participants will typically agree to
meet for the smaller of the two proposed times. As individuals in a social network make decisions
on allocating time, we would like to know: does the social network converge to an equilibrium? If
it does, is it stable? In other words, how sensitive is the network to a small change in proposals
by any one person? What is the social welfare at equilibria?
Motivated by these scenarios, we define a resource allocation game on a social network, and
analyze the game for convergence of the best-response dynamics to Nash equilibria. Next, we
summarize our technical contributions.
1.1 Our Technical Contributions
We define the resource allocation game on a (social) network G = (V,E) where each node i ∈ V
is a rational player (agent) with finite time endowment, say βi. A player i obtains utility by
spending time with her network neighbors Ni which may differ from neighbor to neighbor. First,
she has a private interaction preferences over her neighbors, namely wij for each j ∈ Ni such that∑
j∈Ni wij = 1. Second, to capture decreasing marginal returns, a non-negative, concave, and
increasing function uij captures i’s utility from interaction with j ∈ Ni. In general, we consider
the asymmetric case with respect to (w.r.t) the interaction preferences wij , i.e., wij 6= wji, and
we consider both symmetric and asymmetric cases w.r.t the interaction utility uij . We consider
two types of player behavior, namely optimistic and pessimistic, based on their aggressiveness in
proposing time to neighbors.
A pair of players (i, j) who are neighbors i.e. (i, j) ∈ E, can interact only when both agree to
do so. Thus, if fij is the (time) interaction frequency “proposed” by i to j, and fji by j to i, then
the pair will agree to f∗i,j = min{fij , fji}. The total utility of agent i is:∑
j∈Ni
wijuij(f
∗
ij),
The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of best-response (BR) dynamics of the
resource allocation game. In each round, a chosen player (in some arbitrary sequence) plays
her utility maximizing (best-response) strategy given the proposals of her network neighbors.
This game exhibits non-continuous dynamics, and is non-trivial to analyze. Except for weighted
potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996), BR dynamics do not converge for most games.
Most known results on best response dynamics in (social) network games are under following
settings, symmetry of weights along edges, discrete choices, and no uij ’s, e.g., (Ferraioli et al.,
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2016; Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017; Feldman et al., 2014). The symmetric games are known to be
potential games (Ferraioli et al., 2016) and thus the BR dynamics converge to Nash. The general
form of our game exhibits asymmetry in both wij and uij , and thereby our game does not seem
to be a (weighted) potential game. Despite this, we obtain convergence for a special case and the
general case, described next. These results are independent of the player behavior; optimistic,
pessimistic, or a mix of two.
We first consider the case of global ranking weight system (Section 3.1): there is an intrinsic
social order (e.g., an academic hierarchy, comprising say professors, Ph.D. students and under-
grads, continuing our stylized example) among players, and the wij ’s are proportional to the
global social rank, i.e., if R(j) is the rank of player j ∈ V then wij = R(j)∑
k∈Ni R(k)
. Note that, still
wij 6= wji. Furthermore, we assume that the utility functions are symmetric on every edge —
uij = uji for all (i, j) ∈ E.
Theorem 1 (Informal). The resource allocation game with global ranking weight system is a
weighted potential game. As a consequence, the best-response dynamics in these games converges
to a Nash equilibrium.
Next we consider the general resource allocation game when both weights wij and utilities uij
are asymmetric and show the convergence of BR dynamics (in Section 3.2), despite its seemingly
non-potential nature.
Theorem 2 (Informal). Best response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium in general
resource allocation games with asymmetric preferences.
Our method of proof is akin to the construction of a “two-level” potential-like function using
the unused total time of a specific class of players. We show that the outer function is monotoni-
cally decreasing, and when the outer function is fixed, the inner function decreases. We note that,
when the outer function is decreasing, there are no guarantees for the inner function.
What if players move simultaneously? For the simultaneous-play variant of the best-response
dynamics in our game, we show the existence of a cycle through a stylized example. Note that
potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) e.g., battle of the sexes may also exhibit cyclic
behavior under the simultaneous-play.
We show that, the Price-of-Anarchy (PoA) is unbounded while Price-of-Stability (PoS) is one
(Section 4.1). Interestingly, we can show that the set of Nash Equilibrium is convex under certain
conditions (when all players follow a particular strategy) and is connected in general.
Experiments on a stylized grid show that best response dynamics converge to equilibria with
high social-welfare (see Section 5). Experiments also demonstrate that the social-welfare dis-
tribution of points where BR dynamics converge is unimodal—probably a consequence of con-
nectedness of the equilibrium set. We leave open a formal analysis of this unimodality, and the
qualitative analysis of the social welfare of convergence points through notion of average-price-
of-anarchy (Panageas and Piliouras, 2016a).
1.2 Related Work
The work most related to ours is of Anshelevich and Hoefer (2012) studying contribution games
on networks with symmetric utility functions on each edge. This translates to unweighted case
with uij = uji for each edge (i, j) ∈ E in our model. They analyze 2-strong equilibria, where no
pair of two players can deviate and both gain, for efficiency (PoA), and shows convergence of best
response dynamics. While the notion of 2-strong equilibria is stronger than the notion of a Nash
equilibrium, we observe that the complexity of analyzing best response dynamics in our proposed
work comes from non-symmetric weights on edges.
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There has been extensive work on information diffusion in social networks, where decisions/opinions
are discrete, typically binary, and graphs are weighted (but no uij functions). For example, (Fer-
raioli et al., 2016) study a discrete preference game, and show that it is a potential game and
therefore the best-response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium. In addition they show a
polynomial time convergence rate for unweighted graphs, and pseudo-polynomial time conver-
gence rate for the weighted graphs. (Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017) studies this game under social
pressure and obtain fast convergence in special cases. (Feldman et al., 2014) studies the consensus
game (DeGroot, 1974) under asynchronous updates and the majority rule – a special case of the
linear threshold model. (Chierichetti et al., 2013) studies the price-of-stability of the game when
the edge functions interpolates between symmetric (coordination) and non-symmetric (unilateral
decision-making). Furthermore, a number of works have explored learning (Bala and Goyal, 1998;
Acemoglu et al., 2011; Narasimhan et al., 2015) and herd behavior (Banerjee, 1992).
Our work focuses on best-response dynamics. The best-response dynamics does not converge
generally due to its discontinuous nature, while in coordination, or more generally in congestion
games, the dynamics converges to a pure Nash equilibrium (Montanari and Saberi, 2009). Apart
from BR dynamics, there is extensive literature on the analysis of no-regret dynamics (Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006; Shalev-Shwartz, 2012) within algorithmic game theory, see (Roughgar-
den, 2016a). For general games, the average of the points visited by dynamics converges, but to
correlated equilibria, a weaker notion than Nash equilibrium (Blum et al., 2008). While in case
of coordination games, the dynamics converges point-wise to a pure Nash equilibrium (Losert
and Akin, 1983; Mehta et al., 2015). Panageas and Piliouras (2016b) show that, while the social
welfare at the limit-points of the dynamics may not be near optimal, the expected welfare (av-
erage price-of-anarchy) is almost optimal in a few special cases. Fast convergence of the average
is known for various special cases, e.g., see (Syrgkanis et al., 2015; Daskalakis et al., 2014; Chien
and Sinclair, 2011).
Work in Ecological games on foraging and more generally on predator-prey dynamics (Brown
et al., 1999; Rosenzweig and MacArthur, 1963) analyzes the outcomes of agents who make de-
cisions with resource constraints. The broad idea is that species forage for food, under limited
energy constraints. However, most works focus on population dynamics (growth and depletion of
species) which is not a focus of our paper.
To summarize: our main technical contribution lies in the analysis of best response dynamics
of the resource allocation game where agents have bounded endowment and private, asymmetric
interaction preferences. The main challenge: our game is in general not a potential game, but we
are able to show, through a novel two-level potential-like function approach, convergence to Nash
Equilibria. We analyze PoA, PoS, and characterize the quality of Nash Equilibria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we formally introduce
the game model. Then, in Section 3, we present convergence results for best-response dynamics.
In Section 4, we prove guarantees for several key properties, including the Price of Anarchy and
the Price of Stability. We conclude by presenting experimental results showing the distribution
of the quality of Nash Equilibrium in Section 5, and summarize and discuss future directions
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we first formalize the game played on a social network by the resource constrained
agents, its dynamics, and its Nash equilibria under two different types of player behavior.
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2.1 Game Model
Consider a social network with n agents (players) represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where V represents the players and E the links between them. The players are numbered 1
through n, and we denote the set of all players as P. An edge (link) (i, j) ∈ E represents the
interaction between player i and player j. The set of neighbors of player i ∈ V is denoted by
Ni = {j | (i, j) ∈ E} – note that i can be in Ni.
Players gain utility from communicating/interacting with each other, however the amount
of resources to communicate, such as time, is available in limited quantity to each player. In
particular, player i has βi ≥ 0 amount of communication resource that she can distribute among
her neighbors. Let fij ≥ 0 denote the frequency proposal made by player i to her neighbor j. It
follows that
∑
j∈Ni fij ≤ βi. If we denote the vector of frequency proposals of i to all players inNi by f i = (fi1, . . . , fin), the set of strategies (all possible allocations) of player i is
Fi =
f i
∣∣∣∣ f i ≥ 0, ∑
j∈Ni
fij ≤ βi

where it is understood that fij = 0 if j /∈ Ni. For communication to happen between players
i and j, naturally both have to agree to do so. Therefore, the realized allocation of resource, also
called interaction frequency from now on, on edge (i, j) is
f∗ij = min{fij , fji}.
In other words, f∗ij denotes the agreed upon interaction frequency between i and j. To differ-
entiate we will call fij , proposed interaction frequency.
To capture asymmetric liking of a player and her neighbor, we consider a weighted network
with asymmetric weights. The weight assigned by player i to her neighbor j is denoted by wij .
Note here that wij and wji may be different. Once every player decides her allocation, let f =
(f1, . . . ,fn) denote the allocation profile of all the players, and let f
∗ denote the agreed upon
allocation. The utility of player i at profile f is
ui(f) =
∑
j∈Ni
j 6=i
wijuij(f
∗
ij) (1)
where uij(f
∗
ij) is a non-negative increasing concave function of f
∗
ij and therefore captures
decreasing marginal returns. We are now ready to formally define our game.
Definition 3 (Game). A game consists of a weighted graph G = (V,E) where the nodes are
the players P = V , links E represent the underlying social structure, and weights wij and wji on
link (i, j) ∈ E represent player preferences. For each link (i, j) ∈ E we are given functions uij
and uji capturing respectively utility of player i from interaction with j and vice-versa. Vector β
represents amount of resources of all the players, where the resource constraint of player i ∈ P is
βi. We denote such a game by (P,G,β,u).
Interestingly, our convergence results hold for any arbitrary non-negative, increasing and con-
cave function uij of f
∗
ij ; again uij and uji need not be the same. This leads us to the definition of
the social welfare of our game.
Definition 4 (Social Welfare). Let (P,G,β,u) be a game and f a frequency profile of this
game. Then, the social welfare of (P,G,β,u) at f is
SW (f) =
∑
i∈P
ui(f)
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The Global Ranking Model. Many a times there is an inherent hierarchy among the players
in a social network, e.g. the social network of a company, a network of tennis players, etc. Taking
this as motivation, we define a special case of our model, in which there exists a global ranking
of players capturing their social status within the network, and the weights wij reflect this global
ranking.
Definition 5 (Global-Ranking Weight System). A global ranking is a function R : P 7→ Z+.
By imposing this function on a game (P,G,β,u), we can associate each player i with a number
R(i). The corresponding global ranking weight system is a weighting scheme in which the weight
wij that player i places on player j is defined as
wij =
R(j)
NR(i)
where NR(i) =
∑
k∈Ni
R(k) (2)
2.2 Optimistic/Pessimistic Agents and Nash Equilibria
In this section we discuss the Nash equilibria of our game under two types of players, namely
optimistic and pessimistic. For a given profile f , to denote proposals of all player but i’s we use
f−i.
Definition 6 (Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile f is said to be a Nash equilibrium if no
player gains utility by unilateral deviation (Nash, 1951), i.e.,
∀i ∈ V, ui(f) ≥ ui(f ′i,f−i), ∀f ′i ∈ Fi
At Nash equilibrium every player is playing her utility maximizing strategy given everyone
else’s strategy. Given everyone’s frequency proposals, the utility maximizing proposal of a player
is called her best-response. Thus, at NE every player is playing a best-response to the strategies
of the other players. The best-response of player i with respect to a proposal profile f can be
computed using the following convex program.
max
∑
j∈Ni
j 6=i
wijuij(f
∗
ij)
s.t. f∗ij ≤ fij & f∗ij ≤ fji ∀j ∈ Ni∑
j∈Ni fij ≤ βi
f∗ij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ni
fij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ni
(3)
where note that fji, the proposal of j to i is a constant. For players i and j we have f
∗
ij =
min {fij , fji}, if the proposals are not exactly equal, then one of the players will have some
“leftover” frequency because they had to settle for a lower frequency than they would prefer.
For a specific player i, we call the sum of this “leftover” frequency from the interactions with all
j ∈ Ni the slack of player i, which is equal to
Sli(f) = βi −
∑
j∈Ni
j 6=i
f∗ij
and in the case where Sli is non-zero, we assign the weight of edge {i, i} ∈ E to be f∗ii = Sli.
Furthermore, we call the sum of all the players’ frequency slack the total slack of the game and
we denote it by
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Sl(f) =
n∑
i=1
Sli(f)
If player i proposes lower interaction frequency to j than what j proposes to i, we say that i
“wins” over j, or j is in her “win” set.
Wi(f) =
{
j ∈ Ni | j 6= i and fij < fji
}
Similarly, if i’s proposal to j is at least what j proposes to i then i “loses” to j, or j is in her
“lose” set.
Li(f) =
{
j ∈ Ni | j 6= i and fij ≥ fji
}
Note that it is possible for a player i to have either Wi = ∅ or Li = ∅.
The best-response formulation of (3) raises an interesting question: What should a player do
with her frequency slack, if she has any left even after she matches the frequency proposals of all
her neighbors? Specifically, what should player i do when fij ≥ fji for all j ∈ Ni but Sli(f) > 0?
Since no strategy in this case strictly increases i’s utility, all possible ways of distributing Sli will
give a best-response. To answer this question, we consider two types of players, keeping in mind
the dynamical nature of the system. Consider a player i who has positive slack at a given profile
f .
|Wi(f)| = 0 and Sli(f) > 0.
We call i pessimistic if she decides not to spend any slack frequency on her neighbors, therefore
setting fij = fji and fii = Sli. Similarly, we call i optimistic, if she decides to spend any portion
of her slack frequency on Li, even though this strategy does not increase her utility right now,
with the hope that maybe, at some future time, some player j ∈ Li(t) will have slack frequency
and will be willing to agree to interacting with i at a higher frequency than before.
This distinction is important, as different strategy profiles for the players may lead to different
results in the network in terms of dynamics as well as fixed-points. More specifically, we can define
two different types of equilibria for our game.
Definition 7 (Pessimistic/Optimistic Equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium f is called a pes-
simistic equilibrium if for all i, j ∈ P such that (i, j) ∈ E, we have fij = fji. It is called an
optimistic equilibrium if ∃i ∈ P such that ∃j ∈ Ni and fij > fji.
In words, any profile where proposals are matched on every link is a pessimistic equilibrium.
On the other hand under optimistic equilibria even though players may be proposing higher
frequency to a neighbor, the neighbor does not want to respond by increasing the frequency on
the link to her. This is clearly a stricter condition to achieve compared to pessimistic equilibria.
However, as we will see in the following sections, pessimistic equilibria also turn out to be of
interest, since they possess nice convexity properties.
2.3 Best-Response Dynamics: Sequential or Simultaneous
We analyze dynamics of the interaction in our social network for its convergence properties.
Whenever a player is given an opportunity to update her strategy, it is natural for her to play a
best-response against the current strategy profile of the other players (solution of (3)). Therefore,
we consider the best-response (BR) dynamics under it’s two natural variants, simultaneous move,
and sequential move. Rounds are indexed by t and the frequency proposal profile in round t is
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denoted by f(t) = (f1(t), . . . ,fn(t)). In both cases players start with certain initial proposal at
t = 0 which may be arbitrary or random.
In the sequential BR dynamics, in every round exactly one player updates: In round t, if
there exists a player not playing best-response against f(t) (in other words f(t) is not a Nash
equilibrium), then an arbitrary such player plays a best-response. That is, a player i ∈ P such
that f i(t) is not a best-response against f(t) is chosen, and then f i(t + 1) is a BR of player i
against f(t), while for all j 6= i, f j(t+ 1) = f j(t).
In the simultaneous move setting, all players simultaneously update their proposal and play
best-response to the strategy profile of the previous round, and inform their neighbors. Note
that, there is a unique best-response for a pessimistic player, but an optimistic player i may have
multiple best-responses due to many possible ways of distributing her slack on the neighbors in
Li. In the latter case, we let the best-response be arbitrary. By the definition of Nash equilibrium
(Definition 6), it follows that under both sequential and simultaneous move, the convergence
points of BR dynamics are Nash equilibria, i.e., where every player is playing a best-response to
other player’s strategies.
3 Convergence Analysis and Results
This section presents our main convergence results. We look at how the best-response (BR)
dynamics behave, both in simultaneous and sequential play. The convergence points of the best-
response dynamics are states where no player wants to unilaterally deviate from her strategy
profile, i.e., they are Nash equilibria.
For the sequential move case, we show convergence of BR dynamics to a Nash equilibrium
in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. In Section 3.1 we show that the global ranking model gives a weighted
potential game, and thus the convergence of BR dynamics follows relatively easily. To prove the
convergence in general model however, we need to analyze through a different, indirect manner.
This proof is presented in Section 3.2. Finally, we show in Section 3.3 that in the case of simul-
taneous play, the best-response dynamics need not converge, through a simple counterexample.
Before we continue, we make a quick remark regarding the notation used in this section.
Since frequency proposals depend on time, i.e. the current round of our game, and all other
quantities depend on the current strategy profile, we clarify the notation used below. We use
fij(t) to represent the frequency proposal that player i made to player j, at round t of the
dynamics. Similarly, the frequency that i and j end up interacting at time t is denoted by f∗ij(t), i.e.
f∗ij(t) = min{fij(t), fij(t)}. For brevity, by abuse of notation, we will denote Sli(f(t)), Wi(f(t))
and any other quantity that depends on the frequency profile by Sli(t),Wi(t), etc, respectively.
Finally, due to space constraint we discuss the main ideas here, while all the missing proofs are
presented in Appendix A.
Convergence in Sequential Play. First we consider the best-response dynamics under sequential-
play and show our two main convergence results in Sections 3.2 and 3.2. We show that the best-
response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium when players change their strategies one at
a time. Our proof holds for any general non-negative, increasing and concave utility function
uij(f
∗
ij), which underlines the generality and importance of our results. Furthermore, our result
is independent of the order in which the players take turns to change strategies and relies only
on the fact that each player is playing their best-response strategy that maximizes their utility
at each time step and that eventually all players get to play their turn at some point. It is also
independent of whether the players are optimistic, pessimistic or a mix of the two.
Since only one player can change their strategy at each turn, we have to clarify the time
notation that will be used below. Consider a player i, that makes a proposal fij to j at time t1
and the next proposal f ′ij of i to j happens at time t2 > t1. Then, we consider fij(t) = fij for all
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times t1 ≤ t < t2, and we imagine a “jump” in fij(t) from fij to f ′ij at time t2. This same logic
applies not only to the players’ proposals but to all quantities defined so far.
3.1 Convergence of the Global Ranking Model
We start by providing strong convergence results of our global ranking model. In this section, we
show that the global ranking model is a weighted potential game, as we show the game admits a
weighted potential function when for any players i, j we have uij(f
∗
ij) = uji(f
∗
ij). This condition
does not imply symmetry between players’ interaction, since it may be the case that wij 6= wji.
Theorem 8 (Weighted Potential Game). Given a game (P,G,β,u), a global ranking weight-
ing system R and a strategy profile f , if uij(f
∗
ij) = uji(f
∗
ij) for all strategy profiles f and for all
players i, j ∈ P where j ∈ Ni, then (P,G,β,u) admits a weighted potential function
Φ(f) =
∑
i∈P
R(i) ·NR(i) ·∑
j∈Ni
wijuij(f
∗
ij)
 (4)
and it is a weighted potential game.
The intuition behind our method is twofold. First of all, the players compute their utility
based on f∗, instead of f , meaning that their utility only depends on the frequency they end up
communicating at instead of their frequency proposals. Thus, if player i changes their proposal to
j ∈ Ni, f∗ij changes accordingly and the difference is the same for both i and j. Furthermore, recall
that wij =
R(i)
NR(i) . By scaling player’s i utility in Φ by NR(i), we obtain a symmetric expression
for both players, which allows us to connect i’s effect on j with j’s effect on i.
Since the global ranking model is a weighted potential game, it is well-known that the best-
response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
Corollary 9. Consider a game (P,G,β,u) that admits a global ranking weighting system R and
uij(f
∗
ij) = uji(f
∗
ij) for all strategy profiles f and for all players i, j ∈ P where j ∈ Ni. Then, the
best-response dynamics of (P,G,β,u) converge to a Nash equilibrium.
3.2 Convergence of the General Model
In the previous section, we saw that the best-response dynamics in the special case of the global
ranking model converges to a Nash equilibrium, by constructing a potential function. In contrast,
for the general model, with complete asymmetry in weights, utility functions and behavior of
agents, existence of any such potential function seems unlikely. We obtain the convergence result
for the general model in this section by an in depth analysis of the best-response dynamics.
We show that the best-response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium for the general model
as well, for any non-negative, increasing and concave utility function. As such, our result fully
characterizes the best-response dynamics for this game.
Our argument for the model’s convergence is akin to using a two-stage potential-like func-
tion which decreases at each time step and reaches a minimum which is equivalent to a Nash
equilibrium in our game. In order to avoid infinitesimal changes, first, we impose a reasonable
constraints on proposals of the players. Let η > 0 be the minimum denominator of the resource
under consideration, i.e., η = one second, if the resource is time. Now on we assume that any
pair of players interact only at multiples of a fixed constant η > 0. In other words, for all pairs of
players i, j and all times t, fij(t) = λij(t) · η, where λij(t) : N→ N is a pair-specific function and
η > 0 is a fixed constant. In this case, it is without loss of generality to consider βis’ as well, as
multiples of η. Before proceeding with our main result, we will describe a sufficient condition for
a frequency profile to be a Nash equilibrium.
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Lemma 10. Consider a frequency profile f such that, for every player i ∈ P, |Wi(f)| = 0. Then,
no player i can strictly increase her utility, and f is a Nash equilibrium.
The first stage of our proof is to show that the total slack Sl(t) of the game is monotonically
decreasing.
Lemma 11. Under best-response dynamics, the total slack Sl(t) is monotonically decreasing.
The basic intuition behind the proof of the above lemma is that whenever a player plays her
best-response at each turn, the total slack of the game decreases if she decreases her slack, or
stays the same if she increases her utility without decreasing her slack.
Next, we show that, as the best-response dynamics progress, Sl(t) will decrease and, after
some time t, it will remain constant.
Lemma 12. Under best-response dynamics, if there exist a fixed constant η > 0 such that for all
players i ∈ P and all times t ≥ 0, there exists a λij : N → N for all neighbors j ∈ Ni such that
fij(t) = λij(t) · η, then there exists a time t0 such that Sl(t) = Sl(t0) for all times t ≥ t0.
The basic idea behind the proof of the above lemma is that whenever the total slack of the
game decreases, it decreases by a constant amount, and it is also lower bounded by zero by
definition. Thus, it can only decrease a finite number of times.
Finally, in the following lemma, we argue that the stabilization of the total slack of the game
is sufficient to prove that the best-response dynamics converges to a Nash equilibrium within a
finite number of rounds.
Lemma 13. If there exists some time t0 such that Sl(t) = Sl(t0) for all times t ≥ t0, then the
best-response dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium within a finite number of rounds after t0.
The basic intuition behind the proof of the above lemma is that the total slack does not
decrease in a round only when the chosen player redistributes her frequency, and this redistribution
cannot cycle forever. Theorem 14 now follows from Lemmas 11, 12 and 13.
Theorem 14. Consider a game (P,G,β,u) where utility function uij’s are arbitrary non-negative,
increasing, and concave. The sequential best-response dynamics of (P,G,β,u) converge to a Nash
equilibrium.
3.3 No Convergence in Simultaneous Play
In the previous sections, we showed that when players change their strategies one at a time,
their frequency proposals always converge under the best-response dynamics. Interestingly, the
simultaneous setting is inherently different. In other words, if at each round all the players play
their best-response strategy to the strategies of their neighbors at the previous round simulta-
neously, the best-response dynamics need not converge to an equilibrium. The initial starting
point of the dynamics, i.e. the starting strategy is arbitrary. To illustrate this point, we present a
simple counterexample that exhibits cyclic behavior of the dynamics. This cyclic behavior is well
known, even in potential games. One such famous example is the simple game battle of the sexes
(Roughgarden, 2016b).
Example 15. Consider the following game (P,G,β,u) with 5 optimistic players, P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5},
where the resource constraint βi = 1 is uniform for all players i ∈ P, the utility function of each
player i for a neighbor j is uij(f
∗
ij) = f
∗
ij(1− f∗ij), for 0 ≤ f∗ij ≤ 12 , and G is K5, i.e. the complete
graph with 5 nodes. The weights between the players are represented in the following matrix,
where element (i, j) is equal to wij
10

0 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 0 14 + ε 14 + ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 + ε 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0

for some ε > 0. We want to force a cyclic behavior of the best-response dynamics for all players,
where the players mismatch the frequency proposals they make to each other. Specifically, we make
each player propose a slightly higher frequency to two players and a slightly lower frequency to
the other two, and the weights guarantee that, at each round, each player proposes a higher
frequency to the players that propose a lower frequency to her. Therefore, the players never
match the proposals they make to each other.
Suppose that at time t = 0 the players calculate their best-response. We can easily see that
the solution to (3) for this game is fij = wij . Thus, at time t = 0, each player makes the following
proposals to each other, represented in the following matrix, where element (i, j) is equal to fij(0)
F (0) =

0 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 0 14 + ε 14 + ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 + ε 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0

Notice that the agreement frequencies at t = 0 are going to be
F ∗(0) =

0 14 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 0 14 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε 0 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε 14 − ε 0

Now, all players compute their best-response strategies simultaneously. We observe that for
player i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, their outcome sets are Li(0) = {i mod 5 + 1, (i + 1) mod 5 + 1} and
Wi(0) = {(i + 2) mod 5 + 1, (i + 3) mod 5 + 1}. Furthermore, each player has exactly 4ε slack
frequency. Recall that each player i is optimistic and the weights for both players in Wi(0) are
equal. Since i has slack, their best-response, as calculated by (3), is to allocate 2ε of their slack
to each player in Wi(0).
Therefore, at time t = 1, the frequency proposals of every player are
F (1) =

0 14 − ε 14 − ε 14 + ε 14 + ε
1
4 + ε 0
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 14 + ε
1
4 + ε
1
4 + ε 0
1
4 − ε 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 + ε 14 + ε 0 14 − ε
1
4 − ε 14 − ε 14 + ε 14 + ε 0

which again yields F ∗(1) = F ∗(0). However, note that for all players, Li(1) = Wi(0) and
Wi(1) = Li(0). We apply the previous argument now for t = 2 and get F (2) = F (0), which shows
the existence of a cycle of proposals between all players, implying our model need not converge
in the simultaneous setting.
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4 Properties of the Game
In this section we provide several properties of our game’s best-response dynamics and equilibria.
First, we show that the global optimum of our game is also a Nash equilibrium, which implies that
the Price of Stability (PoS) is 1. We also provide an example with unbounded Price of Anarchy
(PoA), which demonstrates that the social welfare of the Nash equilibria can vary significantly.
Next, we show that the set of Nash equilibria for our game is connected and, more importantly,
the set of pessimistic Nash equilibria is convex. Finally, we fully characterize each player’s best-
response through the well-known Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for local optimality
(Boyd and Vandenberghe, 2004), which provides better intuition as to how each player calculates
her best-response. All the missing proofs of this section are presented in Appendix B.
4.1 Price of Anarchy and Stability
In this section, we focus on the quality of Nash equilibria. We show that the optimal frequency
distribution for all players is also a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, we also show that
there exist arbitrarily low quality Nash equilibria, even for the simpler case of uniform resource
constraints among all players. We quantify these observations through the well-known concepts of
the Price of Anarchy (PoA) (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) and Price of Stability (PoS)
(Anshelevich et al., 2004) respectively. These results show that there is a significant difference
between the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability in our game.
We first provide a definition of the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability for our game.
Definition 16 (Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability). Consider a game (P,G,β,u),
where OPT is the frequency profile that maximizes the social welfare, and Ceq is the set of all
frequency profiles that are Nash equilibria. Then, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is defined as
PoA = sup
f∈Ceq
SW (OPT )
SW (f)
while the Price of Stability (PoA) is defined as
PoS = inf
f∈Ceq
SW (OPT )
SW (f)
We first want to analyze how good a Nash equilibrium can be. Theorem 18 shows that the
optimal solution profile of our game is also a Nash equilibrium. The optimal solution profile of
our game can be seen as the solution to the following (global) convex program
max
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
j 6=i
wijuij(f
∗
ij)
s.t. f∗ij ≤ fij & f∗ij ≤ fji ∀i,∀j ∈ Ni∑
j∈Ni fij ≤ βi ∀i
f∗ij ≥ 0 ∀i,∀j ∈ Ni
fij ≥ 0 ∀i,∀j ∈ Ni
(5)
Note that, unlike (3) where fji was a constant for i’s best-response, it is now a variable in
this program. It is clear that the solution to the above program is the optimal solution profile of
our game, i.e. the frequency profile f˜ that maximizes the social welfare. Recall that Lemma 10
describes a sufficient condition for a frequency profile to be a Nash equilibrium. We now look into
how we can transform any frequency profile into a pessimistic Nash equilibrium, with equal social
welfare, through a simple process of making each player match the proposals of her neighbors.
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Lemma 17. Consider a frequency profile f . Then, we can construct a frequency profile f ′ such
that SW (f ′) = SW (f) and f ′ is a pessimistic Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 17 is enough to guarantee that the optimal solution of our game is also a Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 18. Let (P,G,β,u) be a game. Then, there exists an optimal strategy profile that
maximizes the social welfare of (P,G,β,u) and is also a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let f˜ be the solution of (5). From Lemma 17, we can construct a new frequency profile
f˜
′
from f˜ such that SW (f˜
′
) = SW (f˜) and f˜
′
is a pessimistic Nash equilibrium. Since f˜
′
has the
same social welfare as f˜ , we understand that f˜
′
is also a solution to the global convex program
(5) that maximizes the social welfare. Thus, f˜
′
both maximizes the social welfare of (P,G,β,u)
and is also a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 18 leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 19. The Price of Stability of a game (P,G,β,u) is 1.
Next, we look at how bad can equilibria be for our game. Unfortunately, the next theorem
demonstrates that there exist Nash equilibria with arbitrarily bad social welfare, even for the
simple case where all players have the same resource constraint.
Theorem 20. The Price of Anarchy of a game (P,G,β,u) is unbounded.
4.2 Properties of the set of Nash Equilibria
In this section we look at the convexity and connectedness of the set of Nash equilibria for our
game. Specifically, we show that the set of pessimistic Nash equilibria is convex, which implies
that the set of all Nash equilibria of our game is connected. We start with the following lemma.
Lemma 21. Every optimistic Nash equilibrium f can be transformed into a pessimistic Nash
equilibrium f ′ with the same social welfare. Furthermore, every frequency profile that is a convex
combination of f and f ′ is also an optimistic Nash equilibrium.
We now show that the set of pessimistic Nash equilibria is convex.
Theorem 22. Consider a game (P,G,β,u) with two pessimistic Nash equilibria f and f ′. Any
convex combination of f and f ′ is also a pessimistic Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 21. We want to show that every
convex combination of f and f ′ is also a pessimistic Nash equilibrium. Let α ∈ [0, 1], and
f ′′ = αf + (1 − α)f ′. Consider a pair of players i, j ∈ P. Since f and f ′ are pessimistic Nash
equilibria, we have fij = fji and f
′
ij = f
′
ji. Thus
f ′′ij = αfij + (1− α)f ′ij = αfji + (1− α)f ′ji = f ′′ji
and i, j make matching frequency proposals to each other at f ′′. Since this holds for every
such pair i, j ∈ P, we understand that f ′′ is a pessimistic Nash equilibrium.
Corollary 23. The set of pessimistic Nash equilibria of a game (P,G,β,u) is convex.
The following corollary now follows from Lemma 21 and Theorem 22.
Corollary 24. The set of Nash equilibria of a game (P,G,β,u) is connected.
Finally, we provide a complete characterization of a player’s best-response in Appendix C.
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Fig. 1: We show the difference between the quality of Nash Equilibria, when players adopt ei-
ther pessimistic (i.e. do not redistribute slack), or optimistic (distribute slack over winning set)
strategies (see Section 2.2). We conducted 10,000 simulations on a stylized 4-regular graph with
random weights, uniform endowment (β = 1000) and random initial proposal frequencies. The
histogram (y-axis shows the number of simulations that converge to a particular bin; x-axis is ra-
tio of NE quality to OPT, appropriately binned) shows that the optimistic strategies outperform
pessimistic strategies, with a higher mean quality (dashed lines) and slightly lower variance.
5 Experimental Results
We present results of simulations of best-response dynamics on a stylized graph. We would like
to compute the distribution of Nash Equilibria when players adopt either the pessimistic or the
optimistic strategies to distribute their slack (see Section 2.2). The pessimistic strategy for a
player i involves not distributing slack, while the optimistic strategy involves re-distributing slack
over the winning set (i.e. set of neighbors j ∈ Ni whose proposals are higher than i’s proposals
to her neighbors).
For the simulation, we use a 10 × 10 grid (i.e. a 4-regular graph), with uniform resource
constraint of β = 1000, random edge weights. The simulation involves using random frequency
proposals to start and then compute best-response dynamics using a random sequence of player
updates. We ran 10,000 simulations and noted the quality of Nash Equilibrium for each run for
each strategy. Note that, in our experiments, either all players use the pessimistic strategy or all
players use the optimistic strategy. We show the results in Figure 1, by creating a histogram of the
ratio of the Nash Equilibrium quality to the global optimum, for each strategy. The results show
that on average the quality of Equilibria for the optimistic strategy (µo = 0.908) is significantly
better than the pessimistic strategy (µp = 0.806), and the quality of equilibria for the optimistic
strategy has slightly lower variance (σo = 0.011, σp = 0.017). It is gratifying that the optimistic
strategy does so well. Notice that the distribution is unimodal in for each strategy—we conjecture
that this may be an outcome of the connectedness of the Nash Equilibria (see Corollary 24).
6 Conclusion
The problem of time allocation is one of longstanding interest to Economics and to Sociology
given its importance to economic output and to the sustenance of social networks. In this paper,
we formally studied the resource allocation game, where agents have private, asymmetric interac-
tion preferences and make decisions on time allocation over their social network. The game was
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challenging to analyze since it is not in general, a weighted potential game, and its best response
dynamics are not differentiable. First we showed that a restricted subclass of games where the
interaction preferences are related to the social rank is a weighted potential game. Then, for the
general case, we used a novel two-level potential function approach to show that the best response
dynamics converge to Nash Equilibrium. Our proof is general, and makes no assumptions on the
form of the utility function beyond that it is concave, increasing and non-negative, which are rea-
sonable and standard assumptions. We showed that the Price of Anarchy is unbounded, and that
the Price of Stability is unity. Furthermore, we showed that the Nash Equilibria form a connected
set. Towards understanding the quality Nash equilibrium where best response converges, through
extensive simulation of a stylized graph, we showed that the distribution of quality of Nash
Equilibria are unimodal, which we conjecture is related to the connectedness of Nash Equilibria.
We identify two assumptions that limit the generalizability of our results. Our analysis of
time focuses on costly communication (e.g. a conversation over a phone, or meeting in person).
In online social networks, communication may be asymmetric—agent i may send more messages
to agent j than does agent j send to i. Second we assume that strength of the tie doesn’t change
over time—wij remains the same. In real-world networks, tie strengths improve and degrade
over time (Miritello, 2013). We can incorporate weight changes by allowing weight update of wij
depending on how the neighbor j of agent i reciprocates to her proposals.
Finally, it would be interesting to further understand the quality of Nash equilibrium to which
the resource allocation game converges, through the lens of average price of anarchy (Panageas
and Piliouras, 2016a).
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Appendix
A Missing Proofs of Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 8
Because the game adopts global-ranking weighting scheme, every weight wij can be written as
wij =
R(j)∑
k∈Ni R(k)
=
R(j)
NR(i)
Recall the potential function we proposed in (4). If player i deviates from f i, which is the
vector of frequency proposals to all j ∈ Ni, to f ′i, then
Φ(f−i,f
′
i)− Φ(f) =
∑
i∈P
R(i)NR(i) ∑
j∈Ni
wij(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))

=
∑
i∈P
R(i) ∑
j∈Ni
R(j)(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))

Notice that only i’s neighbors are affected by this deviation, therefore
Φ(f−i,f
′
i)− Φ(f) =
∑
j∈Ni
R(i)R(j)(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))
+
∑
j∈Ni
R(j)R(i)(uji(f
′∗
ij )− uji(f∗ij))
Since uij(f
∗
ij) = uji(f
∗
ij), we have
Φ(f−i,f
′
i)− Φ(f) =
∑
j∈Ni
R(i)R(j)(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))
+
∑
j∈Ni
R(j)R(i)(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))
= 2R(i)
∑
j∈Ni
R(j)(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))
= 2R(i)NR(i)
∑
j∈Ni
wij(uij(f
′∗
ij )− uij(f∗ij))
= 2R(i)NR(i)ui(f
′
i)− ui(f i)
where ui(f) denotes the total utility of player i at strategy profile f .
The difference of in Φ after the move of player i is the difference of i’s utility, scaled by a con-
stant. Therefore (P,G,β,u) is a weighted potential game and always admits a Nash equilibrium
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
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A.2 Proof of Lemma 10
We know that ∀i ∈ P, |Wi(f)| = 0. This implies that ∀j ∈ Ni, fij ≥ fji. Therefore, i is matching
the frequency proposals of all her neighbors, meaning that when i calculates her best-response,
she satisfies all constraints of the form f∗ij ≤ fji in (3) for some j ∈ Ni with equality. It follows
that i cannot increase her utility by unilaterally deviating from f . Since this condition holds for
every i ∈ P, we understand that f is a Nash equilibrium.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 11
Consider that at time t it is i’s turn in our model. Obviously, we have Slj(t+ 1) = Slj(t) for all
j /∈ Ni, since i’s turn did not affect them at all. We first prove the following claims which relate
the slack of i at time t, before she plays her best-response, and at time t + 1, after i has made
new frequency proposals according to her best-response.
Claim 1. If at time t it is i’s turn to play her best-response strategy and |Wi(t)| = 0, then
Sli(t+ 1) = Sli(t). Moreover, Sl(t+ 1) = Sl(t).
Proof. Since |Wi(t)| = 0, i is matching the proposal of all of her neighbors. Thus, every strategy
fi(t+1) where fij(t+1) ≥ fji(t) for all j ∈ Ni is a best-response strategy. This implies that in any
best-response strategy, f∗ij(t+1) = f
∗
ij(t), for all j ∈ Ni. We know that Sli(t) = βi−
∑
j∈Ni f
∗
ij(t),
and also
Sli(t+ 1) = βi −
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t+ 1) = βi −
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t) = Sli(t)
where the second equality follows from the fact that the utility function of i is increasing.
Finally, since i’s proposals did not force any change in the interaction frequency with any
player j ∈ Ni, we have
Slj(t+ 1) = βj −
∑
k∈Nj
f∗jk(t+ 1) = βj −
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
f∗jk(t+ 1)− f∗ji(t+ 1)
= βj −
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
f∗jk(t)− f∗ji(t) = βj −
∑
k∈Nj
f∗jk(t) = Slj(t)
Combining the two observations above, we understand that Sl(t+ 1) = Sl(t).
Claim 2. If at time t it is i’s turn to play her best-response strategy, |Wi(t)| > 0 and Sli(t) ≥ η,
then, Sl(t+ 1) < Sl(t).
Proof. Notice that the proposals fi(t) of i at time t, before i’s turn, is a feasible strategy. It
follows easily that the utility of the best-response strategy of i is at least as good as the utility
of fi(t). Suppose that Sli(t+ 1) ≥ Sli(t). We have
Sli(t+ 1) ≥ Sli(t)⇔ βi −
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t+ 1) ≥ βi −
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t)⇔
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t) ≥
∑
j∈Ni
f∗ij(t+ 1)
⇔
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fij(t) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t)
fji(t) ≥
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fij(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1) (6)
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Now, since at time t only i played her best response, it must be that∑
j∈Ni
fji(t) =
∑
j∈Ni
fji(t+ 1)
⇔
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fji(t) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t)
fji(t) =
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)
⇔
∑
j /∈Wi(t)
fji(t) =
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fji(t) (7)
Substituting (7) into (6) gives us∑
j∈Wi(t)
fij(t) +
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fji(t)
≥
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fij(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)
⇔
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fij(t+ 1) ≥
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fji(t)−
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fij(t) (8)
Since |Wi(t)| > 0, we have by definition that
∃ j ∈ Ni : fji(t) > fij(t)⇔
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fji(t) >
∑
j∈Wi(t)
fij(t) (9)
Thus, combining (8) and (10), we get∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fji(t+ 1)−
∑
j∈Wi(t+1)
fij(t+ 1) > 0 (10)
This implies that there exists at least one player j ∈ Ni such that fij(t + 1) < fji(t + 1), which
directly gives us that |Wi(t + 1)| > 0. Furthermore, since Sli(t) ≥ η and Sli(t + 1) ≥ Sli(t), we
have that Sli(t+1) ≥ η, which gives us that i at time t+1 has both a non-empty winning set and
slack at least η. Since i’s utility function is increasing, she can “spend” her slack on her winning
set and increase her utility which directly contradicts that i played her best-response strategy.
Thus, Sli(t+ 1) < Sli(t).
Claim 3. If at time t it is i’s turn to play her best-response strategy, |Wi(t)| > 0 and Sli(t) = 0,
then Sl(t+ 1) ≤ Sl(t).
Proof. Suppose that i’s best-response dictates that she has to increase her proposal to a set of
agents S ⊆ Wi(t). The slack of i is zero, and thus, in order for i to increase her proposals to S,
she will have to decrease her proposal to a set S′ of agents in her neighborhood. Therefore, we
say that i has to perform some reshuffling of her proposals. First, note that Slj(t + 1) = Slj(t)
for all players j /∈ S ∪ S′, since they are not affected by i’s reshuffling.
If i decreases her proposals to S′ more than how much she wants to increase her proposals to
S, her slack will increase, which implies that this strategy is not a best-response. Thus, we have
that ∑
j∈S′
(fij(t)− fij(t+ 1)) + Sli(t) =
∑
j∈S
(fij(t+ 1)− fij(t)) + Sli(t+ 1)
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By Claim 2, we have that Sli(t+ 1) ≤ Sli(t), which implies∑
j∈S′
(fij(t)− fij(t+ 1)) ≤
∑
j∈S
(fij(t+ 1)− fij(t))
Notice here that upon this reshuffling, the interaction frequency of i with any agent in S ∪S′ will
change immediately. Specifically, we have{
f∗ij(t+ 1) = fij(t+ 1) < f
∗
ij(t) ∀j ∈ S′
f∗ij(t+ 1) = fij(t+ 1) > f
∗
ij(t) ∀j ∈ S
Thus, we get that ∑
j∈S′
(
f∗ij(t)− f∗ij(t+ 1)
) ≤∑
j∈S
(
f∗ij(t+ 1)− f∗ij(t)
)⇔
∑
j∈S∪S′
f∗ij(t) ≤
∑
j∈S∪S′
f∗ij(t+ 1)⇔∑
j∈S∪S′
(
βj − f∗ij(t)
) ≥ ∑
j∈S∪S′
(
βj − f∗ij(t+ 1)
)⇔
∑
j∈S∪S′
Slj(t) ≥
∑
j∈S∪S′
Slj(t+ 1)
Using this fact along with Claim 2 and the fact that agents not in S ∪ S′ are unaffacted by i’s
reshuffling, we get
Sl(t) = Sli(t) +
∑
j /∈S∪S′ Slj(t) +
∑
j∈S∪S′ Slj(t)
≥ Sli(t+ 1) +
∑
j /∈S∪S′ Slj(t+ 1) +
∑
j∈S∪S′ Slj(t+ 1)
= Sl(t+ 1)
We conclude that since at every time t, Sl(t) either decreases or remains constant, Sl(t) is
monotonically decreasing.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 12
We will prove the lemma by contradiction. Assume that for any time t, there exists a time
t′ > t such that Sl(t′) < Sl(t). Since every new proposal at t′ must be at least η greater or
lesser than the previous proposal at time t′ − 1, we know that Sl(t′ − 1) − Sl(t′) ≥ η. Since the
total slack is monotonically decreasing by Lemma 11, we have that Sl(t′ − 1) ≤ Sl(t), and thus
Sl(t) − Sl(t′) ≥ η. Now, the argument can be repeated once again. We know that after at most∑n
i=1 βi
η + 1 such repeats of this argument, we will reach a time t
∗ such that Sl(t∗) < 0, and we
arrive at a contradiction, based on the definition of the total slack of the game. Thus, we conclude
that there exists a time t0 such that Sl(t) = Sl(t0) for all times t ≥ t0.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 13
Suppose we are at time t ≥ t0, after the total slack has stabilized. Since η is the minimum
denomination of the resource, it is without loss of generality to assume that all βi’s are multiple
of η. Furthermore, players’ proposals are in multiples of η, and therefore for any player i, Sli(t)
is either 0 or at least η at any time t.
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First of all, note that at time t there must exist some player i with |Wi(t)| > 0, because if
Wi(t) = 0 for all players i ∈ P, then, by Lemma 10, we have reached a Nash equilibrium. Also,
note that for every player i that has |Wi(t)| > 0, it must be that Sli(t) = 0. Otherwise, by Claim
2, we get that the total slack decreases, which contradicts our hypothesis. Thus, we can partition
the players into two sets, V1(t) and V2(t), where V1(t) is the set of players i that have |Wi(t)| = 0
and Sli(t) ≥ 0, while V2(t) is the set of players j that have |Wj(t)| > 0 and Slj(t) = 0. Note that,
sets V1(t) and V2(t) covers all the players.
We first show that players in V1(t) are always playing best-response after time t0.
Claim 4. For all t ≥ t0, and for all i ∈ V1(t), f i(t) is a best-response against f(t).
Proof. Since i ∈ V1(t), we understand that |Wi(t)| = 0. By the definition of Wi(t), we have that
fij(t) ≥ fji(t), for all players j ∈ Ni. Thus, if we try to compute best-response of player i against
f(t) using the (local) convex program (3), then all inequalities of the form f∗ij ≤ fji(t) will be
tight, since i has extra budget but no neighbor to spend on to and uijs are increasing in f
∗
ij . Thus,
it follows that f i(t) is a best-response of player i against f(t).
The above claim implies the strategies of the agents in V1(t) do not change at time t.
Claim 5. V1(t) ⊆ V1(t+ 1).
Proof. By Claim 4, players in V1(t) will not change their strategies at time t. Thus, the player
who changes strategy and plays a best-response at time t has to belong to V2(t). Let i ∈ V2(t) be
a player that changes her strategy between times t and t+ 1, i.e., ∀j 6= i f j(t+ 1) = f j(t).
Since |Wi(t)| > 0, i does not have enough budget to match every proposal made to her, we
understand that i’s best-response strategy forces fij(t) ≤ fji(t) for all j ∈ Ni. Since Sli(t) = 0,
her best-response strategy for t + 1 can never be to exceed a proposal made to her, since this
yields no utility, while there is utility to be gained for i by trying to match the players in Wi(t).
Thus, we understand that i’s best-response strategy forces fij(t + 1) ≤ fji(t + 1) for all j ∈ Ni.
Since there is no j ∈ Ni such that fij(t + 1) > fji(t + 1), every player k ∈ V1(t) will still have
|Wk(t+ 1)| = 0, and thus k ∈ V1(t+ 1).
Next, we show that whenever a player in V2(t) increases her utility, it increases by at least
some fixed constant.
Claim 6. If at time t it is i’s turn to play her best-response strategy and i ∈ V2(t), then either
ui(f(t+ 1)) = ui(f(t)), or
ui(f(t+ 1)) ≥ ui(f(t)) +∆i
where ∆i > 0 is a fixed constant.
Proof. At time t, i calculates her best-response strategy f i(t+1) by solving (3). Since the solution
to (3) maximizes i’s utility at time t+ 1, we know that
ui (f(t+ 1))− ui (f(t)) ≥ 0
Clearly, if ui (f(t+ 1)) = ui (f(t)), then f i(t) is also a best-response strategy at time t+ 1, and
i can simply not change strategies and get the same utility. Suppose now that ui (f(t+ 1)) >
ui (f(t)). We know that fij(t) = λij(t) · η and fij(t + 1) = λij(t + 1) · η. Thus, there exist only(
βi
η
)2
choices for the pair (fij(t), fij(t + 1)). By the same argument, there exist only
(
βi
η
)2|Ni|
choices for the pair of strategies (f i(t),f i(t+ 1)), which are finite. Recall that Fi denotes the set
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of all possible strategies of i. Let F2>i be the set of all possible pairs of strategies of i such that
the first has higher utility than the second. In other words,
F2>i =
{(
f i,f
′
i
) ∣∣∣∣ f i,f ′i ∈ Fi and ui(f) > ui(f ′)}
We define
∆i = min(
f i,f
′
i
)
∈F2>i
ui(f)− ui(f ′)
This is the minimum possible increase in utility between two strategy profiles of i, and it is a fixed
positive constant, since |Fi|2 is finite. Clearly, for any pair of strategy profiles (f i(t),f i(t+ 1)) of
i, if ui (f(t+ 1)) > ui (f(t)), then ui(f(t+ 1)) ≥ ui(f(t)) +∆i.
Finally, we show that utility of players in V2 is non-decreasing.
Claim 7. For all i ∈ V2(t), ui(f(t+ 1)) ≥ ui(f(t)).
Proof. At time t suppose k ∈ V2(t) plays a best-response. By Claim 6, uk(f(t + 1)) > uk(f(t)).
Now consider an i ∈ V2(t) other than k. The only way i’s utility decreases is if i is a neighbor of k,
and k decreases her proposal to i. Since, Sli(i) = 0, it must be the case that fki(t) = fik(t), and
after the k changes we have fki(t+ 1) ≤ fik(t)− η. This implies Sli(t+ 1) ≥ η. Since i ∈ V2(t) we
already knew that |Wi(t)| > 0. Since k /∈Wi(t), at time (t+ 1) the set Wi is same as at t. Thus,
we have Sli(t + 1) > 0 and |Wi(t + 1)| > 0. Then, by Lemma 2 the total slack has to decrease
after some time, a contradiction to the hypothesis that the total slack is constant.
To conclude, by Claim 5 set V1 is monotonically increasing, while for players in set V2 the
utility is non-decreasing (Claim 7). Furthermore, since all players in V1 are at their best-response,
in every round a player in V2 changes strategy and by Claim 6 increases her utility by a non-trivial
amount. Now, if the maximum utility an agent can achieve is bounded, then the dynamics has
to converge in finite time and the proof follows.
Next, we calculate the maximum possible utility that i could ever obtain. This is given by
the following convex program which describes the ideal frequency allocation according to player
i, ignoring contraints put by the other players
max
∑
j∈Ni
j 6=i
wijuij(f
∗
ij)
s.t.
∑
j∈Ni fij ≤ βi
fij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ni
(11)
Let OPTi be the solution to (11). Notice that i’s proposals here are not restricted by j’s proposals,
which implies that i cannot get more utility than OPTi with budget βi. Therefore, player i ∈ V2
can only change strategies to increase her utility at most OPTi∆i times, after which she cannot
increase her utility anymore. Thus the proof follows using Claims 6 and 7.
B Missing Proofs of Section 4
B.1 Proof of Lemma 17
We construct a new frequency profile f ′ from f such that SW (f ′) = SW (f) and f ′ is a Nash
equilibrium, in the following way. For every player i ∈ P, we look at i’s proposals to her neighbors
in f . For every j ∈ Ni such that fij > fji, we adjust i’s proposal to j so that i matches j’s proposal
to her, thus having f ′ij = fji. In other words, we make i into a pessimistic player.
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Since this procedure is done for all players, it follows that every player in Wi(f) lowered their
proposal to i to match i’s proposal to them. Thus, ∀j ∈ Wi(f), in f ′, we have f ′ji = fij = f ′ij .
Since i is now matching all frequency proposals of her neighbors, it follows that |Wi(f ′)| = 0.
Since this condition holds for every i ∈ P, from Lemma 10 we get that f ′ is a Nash equilibrium.
We finally show that SW (f ′) = SW (f). Indeed, since the only difference between f ′ and f
are the proposals of player i to j for the players j such that fij > fji, we understand that in i’s
utility calculation, i already satisfied the constraint f∗ij ≤ fji with equality. Thus, this decrease in
proposal from fij > fji to f
′
ij = fji, does not affect i’s utility at all. Thus, for every player i ∈ P,
we get that ui(f
′) = ui(f), which implies SW (f ′) = SW (f).
B.2 Proof of Theorem 20
Consider the game with players on a two-dimensional grid presented in Fig. (2). The graph in
this game is 4-regular and every player has exactly 4 neighbors. Given a player i in row k, she
has one neighbor in row k+ 1, two neighbors in row k, and one neighbor in row k−1. We assume
that, for every player i in row k, wij =
1
2 − ε if j is a vertical neighbor (either in row k − 1 or
in row k + 1), while wij = ε if j is a horizontal neighbor, i.e. j is in row k. Thus, every player
wants to interact more with her vertical neighbors and wants to have almost no interaction with
her horizontal neighbors. Furthermore, we assume that all players i ∈ P have the same resource
constraint βi = β, and that for all players i, j where j ∈ Ni, the utility that i gets from j is
uij(f
∗
ij) = f
∗
ij(β − f∗ij) for 0 ≤ f∗ij ≤ β2 .
(a) Frequency profile with high social welfare. (b) NE with low social welfare.
Fig. 2: Example of a game with arbitrarily bad PoA.
Consider two frequency profiles fgood and f bad. In fgood, we have every player i assigning
frequency β2 −ε to her vertical neighbors and ε to her horizontal neighbors, as shown in Fig. (2a).
In f bad, every player i assigns frequency ε to her vertical neighbors and
β
2 − ε to her horizontal
neighbors, as shown in Fig. (2b). We show that fgood corresponds to a frequency profile with
good social welfare, while f bad corresponds to a Nash equilibrium with bad social welfare.
First of all, notice that in f bad every player is matching all her neighbors’ frequency propos-
als. Thus, for every player i ∈ P, we have |Wi(f bad)| = 0, which implies that f bad is a Nash
equilibrium, by Lemma 10. No player has positive slack and thus, no player can gain more utility
by unilaterally deviating from her proposals.
We proceed by calculating the social welfare in fgood and f bad. In fgood, every player i gets
utility
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ui(fgood) = 2
(
1
2
− ε
)(
β
2
− ε
)(
β
2
+ ε
)
+ 2ε2 (β − ε)
while in f bad, every player i gets utility
ui(f bad) = 2ε
(
β
2
− ε
)(
β
2
+ ε
)
+ 2
(
1
2
− ε
)
ε (β − ε)
Therefore, the social welfare in the two profiles is
SW (fgood) = n
(
2
(
1
2
− ε
)(
β
2
− ε
)(
β
2
+ ε
)
+ 2ε2 (β − ε)
)
and
SW (f bad) = n
(
2ε
(
β
2
− ε
)(
β
2
+ ε
)
+ 2
(
1
2
− ε
)
ε (β − ε)
)
Let OPT be the solution profile that maximizes the social welfare, and let NEworst be the
Nash equilibrium that minimizes the social welfare. We have
PoA =
SW (OPT )
SW (NEworst)
≥ SW (fgood)
SW (f bad)
=
n
(
2
(
1
2 − ε
) (β
2 − ε
)(
β
2 + ε
)
+ 2ε2 (β − ε)
)
n
(
2ε
(
β
2 − ε
)(
β
2 + ε
)
+ 2
(
1
2 − ε
)
ε (β − ε)
) (12)
It is easy to see that lim
ε→0
PoA = +∞. Thus, we can make the PoA arbitrarily large by de-
creasing ε. Notice that this result does not depend on the size of the grid, so the game can have
bad Nash equilibria even with a small number of players.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 21
The first part of the statement follows immediately from Lemma 17. We want to show that
every convex combination of f and f ′ is also an optimistic Nash equilibrium. Let α ∈ (0, 1], and
f ′′ = αf + (1 − α)f ′. If α = 0, then f ′′ = f ′ and it is a pessimistic Nash equilibrium, thus
we focus on all other values of α. Consider a pair of players i, j ∈ P such that fij > fji in f .
Obviously, f ′ij = f
′
ji in f
′.
By our construction of f ′ from Lemma 17, we have that fji = f ′ji. Thus, we understand that
f ′′ji = f
′
ji = fji in f
′′. For i’s frequency proposal we have
f ′′ij = αfij + (1− α)f ′ij (13)
Since fij > fji in f , let fij = fji + δ, where δ > 0. Then, (13) becomes
f ′′ij = α(fji + δ) + (1− α)f ′ij = α(fji + δ) + (1− α)f ′ji = α(fji + δ) + (1− α)fji
= fji + α · δ
We see that i’s proposal to j in f ′′ is f ′′ij = fji + α · δ > fji. Since f is a Nash equilibrium,
player j gained no utility by deviating from their strategy and increasing their proposal to i.
In f ′′ i still proposes higher than j in their interaction, but her proposal is a lower one overall.
Because j did not gain any utility by deviating in f , she will still not gain any utility by deviating
in f ′′. Since this holds for every such pair i, j ∈ P, we understand that f ′′ is an optimistic Nash
equilibrium.
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C Characterization of the Best-Response
In this section, we attempt to understand the players’ best-response in depth. As stated in section
2, at each turn t, the player that is picked to update her proposals solves the local convex program
(3) in order to maximize her utility. We look at the KKT conditions of (3) in order to obtain
better intuition as to how this update is performed.
Let i be the player that updates her opinion at time t, for a given profile f−i. We look at the
dual of (3). Let λij be the dual variable corresponding to the constraint f
∗
ij ≤ fij , λji be the dual
variable corresponding to f∗ij ≤ fCji , and δi be the dual variable corresponding to
∑
j∈Ni fij ≤ βi.
The KKT conditions of (3) are the following
wij
∂uij
∂f∗ij
≤ λij + λji ⊥ f∗ij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ni
λij ≤ δi ⊥ fij ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ Ni
(14)
where ⊥ denotes the complementarity of the conditions, meaning that one of the two inequal-
ities on the left and on the right side of ⊥ have to be tight, i.e. hold with equality. Let us reorder
the players in Ni in the following order, where
wi1
∂ui1
∂f∗i1
∣∣∣∣
f∗i1=0
≥ wi2∂ui2
∂f∗i2
∣∣∣∣
f∗i2=0
≥ · · · ≥ wik ∂uik
∂f∗ik
∣∣∣∣
f∗ik=0
where k = |Ni|.
Initially, let all fij = 0. Now i tries to maximize her utility, by increasing fi1, because
wi1
∂ui1
∂f∗i1
∣∣∣
f∗i1=0
is the highest in her neighbourhood. i will keep increasing fi1 alone, until wi1
∂ui1
∂f∗ij
=
wi2
∂ui2
∂f∗i2
∣∣∣
f∗i2=0
. At that point, i will get the same increase in utility by both players 1 and 2.
Thus, i will start increasing both fi1 and fi2 simultaneously. Again, this will be optimal until
wi1
∂ui1
∂f∗i1
= wi2
∂ui2
∂f∗i2
= wi3
∂ui3
∂f∗i3
∣∣∣
f∗i3=0
. This process continues in a similar manner.
If during the process we get fij = fji for some j ∈ Ni as fij increases, then i will stop
increasing fij because f
∗
ij = fji, and i’s utility will not increase by further increasing fij , as
indicated by (3). Instead i will start increasing λij to accommodate for that fact. In the end, we
either have
∑
j∈Ni fij = βi and i has allocated fully her resource, or fij = fji ∀j ∈ Ni, and thus
Sli > 0.
It is clear that via this analysis we get a full characterization of i’s best-response. This iter-
ative process helps us understand our game more as well as provides some intuition as to why
best-response dynamics converge. Finally, this analysis help us model the best-response in our
experiments, as discussed in section 5.
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